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COVID-19 transmission rates are often linked to locally circulating strains of SARS-CoV-2.
Here we describe 203 SARS-CoV-2 whole genome sequences analyzed from strains circu-
lating in Rwanda from May 2020 to February 2021. In particular, we report a shift in variant
distribution towards the emerging sub-lineage A.23.1 that is currently dominating. Further-
more, we report the detection of the first Rwandan cases of the B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 variants of
concern among incoming travelers tested at Kigali International Airport. To assess the
importance of viral introductions from neighboring countries and local transmission, we
exploit available individual travel history metadata to inform spatio-temporal phylogeographic
inference, enabling us to take into account infections from unsampled locations. We uncover
an important role of neighboring countries in seeding introductions into Rwanda, including
those from which no genomic sequences were available. Our results highlight the importance
of systematic genomic surveillance and regional collaborations for a durable response
towards combating COVID-19.
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The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), due to severeacute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2),continues to impose a heavy death toll globally and
represents a major global health challenge. The SARS-CoV-2 is a
single-stranded positive-sense ribonucleic acid (RNA) virus that
typically undergoes one to two single nucleotide mutations per
month. Real-time whole-genome sequencing provides invaluable
insights on the pandemic’s transmission dynamics and enables
effective surveillance. Moreover, genomic data provide useful
information required for the ongoing development of vaccines,
therapeutics, and diagnostic tools. Analysis of SARS-CoV-2
mutations is particularly crucial when these affect epitopes
involved in the induction of host immune responses as they may
lead to immune evasion, with potential implications for vaccine
(and immunotherapy) efficacy.
The global SARS-CoV-2 lineage nomenclature has already
been proposed with A and B as the initial epidemiological
lineages representing the two original haplotypes in Wuhan1,
followed by a number of sub-lineages. As described by Rambaut
et al. ref. 1, Pango lineages are monophyletic clusters of SARS-
CoV-2 that are linked to an epidemiological event. Such an event
can be an introduction into a distinct geographic area, evidence of
increased transmission or a series of functionally relevant muta-
tions. Variants of SARS-CoV-2 are defined by having a con-
stellation of biologically relevant mutations, and many variants
are now being monitored closely by the WHO and other public
health agencies around the world. Variants may correspond to
lineages directly as they operate on the same resolution, but some
variants do not (e.g. B.1.1.7+ E484K is a variant, but does not
correspond to a specific lineage as it has arisen many times
independently). A number of variants of concern (VOCs) have
been formalized by the WHO such as the Alpha VOC (B.1.1.7,
20I/501Y.V1 or VOC 202012/01), characterized by 23 mutations
(13 non-synonymous mutations, four deletions and six synon-
ymous mutations), that is associated with higher transmissibility2
and increased mortality;3,4 and the Beta VOC (B.1.351 or 20H/
501Y.V2) that emerged independently of B.1.1.7, shares some
mutations with the B.1.1.7 VOC and has recently also been
associated with low vaccine efficacy in South Africa5. In Rwanda,
the first case of SARS-CoV-2 was confirmed in the capital city of
Kigali on March 14th 2020, following a series of testing at the
borders and the Kigali International Airport, (KIA), and was
linked to incoming travelers from Mumbai, India. Subsequently, a
countrywide total lockdown, coupled with strict prevention
measures including contact tracing, was enforced for nearly
2 months aiming to contain the spread of the virus (Fig. 1A and
Supplementary Table S1). From May 2020, lockdown restrictions
were lifted progressively, a number of commercial activities
resumed and the KIA reopened on the 1st of August 2020
(Supplementary Table S1). However, despite continued massive
testing6, contact tracing, hotspot mapping, and preventive
measures7, the number of cases continued to increase (Fig. 1 and
Supplementary Figure S1), mainly associated with cross-border
land travels through truck drivers8 and imported cases (Supple-
mentary Fig. S2). This culminated in a ‘first wave’ of local
transmission between July and September 2020. Additional con-
tainment measures led to the decline of cases until November
2020 when schools and most activities resumed. In December
2020, another ‘wave’ of infections hit the country, peaking in
January–February 2021. As a result, new movement restrictions
were enforced, including a total lockdown in the capital city and a
7 days’ quarantine for international travelers in addition to two
negative polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests, one pre-
departure and another one upon arrival (Supplementary
table S1).
In this study, we reconstruct the introduction and subsequent
dispersal of lineages A.23.1 and B.1.380 based on genomic analysis
of isolates from the first and second waves of the epidemic in
Rwanda. In particular, we highlight a shift from the ancestral
dominant B.1.380 lineage in the early stages of local transmission
to a new lineage, A.23.1, that is currently dominating throughout
the country. Combining the collected genomic sequence data with
associated individual travel histories to perform travel history-
aware phylogeographic inference, we infer introductions into
Rwanda from all of its surrounding countries including those from
which no genomic sequences are available. Given the importance
of these findings on regional surveillance of SARS-CoV-2, we
emphasize the need for strengthening genomic surveillance at the
country’s points of entry following the detection of the first cases
of the B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 VOCs among travelers arriving at KIA.
Results
Patient characteristics. As of the 10th February 2021, a total of
16,865 cases have been confirmed in the country and the
sequences analyzed represent 1.2% of the total confirmed cases.
The proportion of daily confirmed cases versus the number of
sequences taken is illustrated in Fig. 1. In Supplementary Fig. S1,
we show a breakdown per month of these numbers, illustrating
differences in genome sampling intensity compared to case
counts throughout our study period, with the difference being
most pronounced during the first 6 weeks of 2021. We sampled a
total of 203 cases (reflecting the national screening efforts at
points of entry and emerging hotspots) with an average age of
36.7 years, of whom 131 were males and 70 females (and two
unknowns) in this study. Of these, location data were available for
152 individuals, of whom 99 lived in Kigali while others were
living in different districts of the country. Significant efforts were
made to obtain associated metadata for all cases, with specific
attention to individual travel history data, as these may shed light
on the origins of viral variants introduced from neighboring
countries (Supplementary Data 1). Of the 203 cases, 28 had
recorded travel history (mainly sampled at the airport and other
points of entry through national monitoring and testing efforts)
from Tanzania (6), Kenya (4), Demographic Republic of Congo
(3), Uganda (3), United States of America (2), United Arab
Emirates (2), South Sudan (1), Italy (1), Morocco (1), Senegal (1),
Canada (1), China (1), Gabon (1), and Burundi (1). We show the
origin of these collected travel cases for which we have genomic
data in Fig. 2, with a focus on neighboring countries, which
reveals that most travel cases originated in Tanzania, a country
that has not yet made any genomic data available. Other
important countries from which travelers originated were Kenya,
Uganda, and Burundi, representative of the collected data on
infected travelers arriving in Rwanda via air travel (Supplemen-
tary Fig. S2). We show the number of genome sequences and
individual travel cases into Rwanda from these countries in Fig. 3.
We also provide the GISAID accession identifiers associated with
these genomes in Supplementary Table S2. For many African
countries, limited to no sequences were available in GISAID, with
sequencing heterogeneously clustered throughout the time period
considered in this study. The availability of travel history data is
thus critical in these cases as it allows us to characterize the viral
population in these countries despite the absence of samples. We
note that the travel cases from surrounding countries originate
from the second half of 2020, with no such data being available
from earlier time periods.
Lineage characterization. The available genomes were analyzed
using the Pangolin module1. We show in Fig. 3 that the majority
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of the SARS-CoV-2 sequences in Rwanda belong to two distinct
lineages, A.23.1 and B.1.380. However, the dynamics of their
distribution changed over time, as shown in Fig. 4. Indeed, the
early stages of local transmission were characterized by circula-
tion of a dominant B.1.380 lineage, which has only been observed
in Rwanda and Uganda. The diversity of the viral strains observed
in the period of May to July 2020 are most likely early imports
from Europe and Asia before suppressive measures (such as the
countrywide lockdown and the airport closure; see Supplemen-
tary Table S1) were enforced. Nevertheless, an increased strain
diversity is observed from the period August–October 2020, most
likely reflecting introductions through cross-border land travels
for goods and cargo8.
Towards the end of 2020, we observed a selective sweep, with
lineage A.23.1 taking over. This sub-lineage, first observed in
Uganda in late 2020 was reported to contain at least four amino
acid changes in the spike protein and amino acid changes in the
proteins nsp3, nsp6, ORF8, and ORF99. In particular, these
authors suggest that the Q613H mutation in spike may be
functionally equivalent to the D614G mutation that arose early in
2020 and is associated with increased viral transmissibility10.
Bugembe et al. ref. 9. describe a selective sweep across Uganda of
this lineage, which is now the dominant lineage circulating in
Uganda as well. Rwandan genome sequencing shows the presence
of A.23.1 as early as October 21st 2020 and a sweep of this lineage
was observed from late November (Fig. 4). A.23.1 continues to be
the dominant lineage within Rwanda up until February 2021.
More recently a number of infections associated with travel have
been identified as variants of concern. The first import cases of
B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 variants were sampled on December 28th
2020 and January 4th 2021, respectively. Analysis by Volz et al.
ref. 2. suggests that B.1.1.7 is a more transmissible lineage, with a
recent study suggesting that B.1.1.7 is not only more transmissible
than preexisting SARS-CoV-2 variants, but that it may also cause
more severe illness and is associated with increased mortality4.
However, data inclusive of this paper do not report onward
transmission of these VOCs.
Phylogeographic reconstruction accommodating individual
travel histories. We made use of publicly available data and the
sequenced Rwandan SARS-CoV-2 genomes - all available in
GISAID11,12 (Supplementary Data 2) - to infer a time-scaled
phylogenetic tree using maximum-likelihood inference (see
“Methods”). This phylogeny enabled us to identify two subtrees
with predominantly Rwandan sequences (Supplementary Fig. S3).
Both of these subtrees consist of genetically distinct lineages, with
the larger cluster belonging to lineage B.1.380 (and hence referred
to as subtree B.1) and the smaller one to A.23.1 (referred to as
subtree A). The considerable difference in sampling dates and
genetic distance between the sequences suggests that the currently
circulating SARS-CoV-2 Rwandan lineages are a result of at least
two independent introduction events that established local
transmission. Subtrees A and B.1 have 172 and 218 sequences,
and contain a total of 49 and 134 Rwandan sequences,
respectively.
To more accurately understand the pattern of SARS-CoV-2
introductions into Rwanda, we performed a Bayesian discrete
phylogeographic analysis on subtrees A and B.1 (Supplementary
Data 3, 4). The 172 genomes in subtree A originated from 33
locations and included all sequences from lineage A.23.1. The 218
genomes in subtree B originated from 37 locations and included
the B.1.380 lineage. In our analysis of both subtrees, we fit a travel
Fig. 1 Comparison of the number of sequences taken and case counts over time and space. A time series of month of sequence collection date (thicker
bars), with thinner bars the daily new cases reported nationally until the 10th of February, 2021. Control measures are shown above the time series as
colored dots, with darker colors representing more restrictions; B shows the number of sequences in this study by the district of residence; C log-
transformed number of cumulative cases by the district until the 10th of February, 2021.
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history-aware asymmetric discrete-state diffusion process to
model the spatial spread between countries. Our phylogeographic
reconstructions included a total of 17 sequences with travel
history, 11 for the analysis of subtree A and six for subtree B.1.
Interestingly, some of these sequences have associated travel
histories originating from Tanzania (four in subtree A and one in
subtree B.1), a country that had not reported any COVID-19
cases since May 8th, 202013, and also has no publicly available
genomes on GISAID. While Burundi and South Sudan have been
consistently reporting case numbers, no genomic sequences are
available on GISAID from these countries yet. Our joint
phylogeographic reconstructions are able to include those
countries as locations with SARS-CoV-2 infections (which can
then be considered as possible ancestral locations), by exploiting
data on infected incoming travelers from those countries. This
type of phylogeographic reconstruction enables to more accu-
rately reconstruct the spread of pathogens by exploiting
additional observed data, in the form of documented individual
travel histories (which don’t need to be inferred).
Figures 5 and 6 show the estimated location-annotated
phylogenies that enable to track the geographic spread of
SARS-CoV-2 through time for subtrees A and B.1, with a focus
on the available Rwandan sequences. In our analysis of subtree A
(Fig. 5), which contains sequences from lineages A.23 and A.23.1,
we inferred a minimum number of 22 (HPD 95%: [16–29])
introduction events into Rwanda, with a minimum of respectively
13 and 4 of these events originating from Uganda and Kenya
(Fig. 7 and Supplementary Table S3). We found an expected
number of two introduction events from Tanzania into Rwanda,
corresponding to and being derived from the two arriving traveler
cases, as well as single introduction events from South Sudan and
China into Rwanda. Figure 5 also shows frequent mixing between
Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya, with the latter two estimated to
have seeded introductions into Tanzania, from where no genomic
sequences are available to date. However, by carefully collecting
metadata of infected individuals, we are able to confirm the
presence of lineage A.23.1 among travelers from Tanzania,
despite the absence of genomic data. Our travel history-aware
inference methodology further enables us to consider such
unsampled countries to determine the intensity of exchanges
between countries and potentially even infer one of the
unsampled countries as the origin of the lineage. In our analysis
of subtree B.1, which includes Rwandan lineage B.1.380, we
inferred a minimum number of nine (HPD 95%: [8–12])
introduction events into Rwanda, with three of these events
originating from Kenya (Fig. 7 and Supplementary Table S3). We
also found an expected number of two introduction events from
both Uganda and Italy. Using Bayesian stochastic search variable
selection (BSSVS), we identified seven statistically supported
(Bayes Factor > 3) transition routes into Rwanda for subtree A
and six for subtree B.1 (Supplementary Table S3). Our analysis on
subtree A showed that Uganda accounted for the majority of
SARS-CoV-2 introductions into Rwanda (mean number of
Markov jumps: 13.1; 95% HPD: [7–20]), whereas our analysis
on subtree B.1 identified Kenya as the main source of SARS-CoV-
2 introductions into Rwanda (mean number of Markov jumps:
3.2; 95% HPD: [0–5]).
Consistent with previously published analyses of SARS-CoV-2,
we observe that our discrete Bayesian phylogeographic recon-
structions resulted in MCC trees of which the internal nodes can
be poorly supported, a common phenomenon in SARS-CoV-2
phylogenies (Figs. 5 and 6). The considerable uncertainty in
phylogenetic clustering results in a variety of diverging phylogeo-
graphic histories, which end up not being captured in the MCC
Fig. 2 Map showing the number of sequences with recorded travel history per country (n= 28).While there is travel into Rwanda recorded from across
the world, most cases are from neighboring countries, notably Tanzania (6), Kenya (3), Demographic Republic of Congo (3), Uganda (3), South Sudan (1),
Gabon (1), and Burundi (1).
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trees as these only represent point estimates of the posterior
distribution. To this end, we explored the ancestral spatial
histories of individual samples of interest using Markov jump
trajectory plots14,15 (Fig. 8). In the case of subtree A, the travel-
aware reconstructions showed four sequences consistently form-
ing two clusters with posterior support > 0.9. However, the first
two of these four cases correspond to cross-border truck drivers
of Tanzanian nationality (sampled on the same day on the same
sampling location, i.e. the Rusumo border), with no such
metadata available for the other two cases in subtree A. Hence,
the two inferred introductions actually correspond to four
introduction events from Tanzania into Rwanda, which are
clustered together by location in our joint inference, likely as a
result of additional samples currently lacking from the border
region. Because of this, sequences in each cluster result in nearly
identical spatial histories. Fig. 8A, B show the Markov jump
trajectory plots for these two introductions. Overall, we see
considerable ambiguity in the ancestral locations prior to
Tanzania, as seen by the density of lines landing in “Other”
alternate locations. More broadly, we see that in both cases the
Rwandan sequences diverged from ancestors in Tanzania, Kenya,
and Uganda, with considerable uncertainty placed at the root,
among the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sierra
Leone, and Mali. The introduction in subtree B, on the other
hand, presents us with a different ancestral relation with Tanzania
(Fig. 8C). Although we also generally observe considerable
uncertainty in the ancestral paths, we observe a strong signal
for an ancestry in Rwanda prior to the introduction from
Tanzania. This would imply a transmission chain starting in
Rwanda, spreading into Tanzania, and then being reintroduced
into Rwanda. A similar dynamic of outflow and inflow of
Rwandan lineages can be seen in the ancestral histories for the
sequences with travel history to Morocco, Italy, and the DRC
(Supplementary Figure S5). This suggests a bidirectional
exchange of SARS-CoV-2 genomes between each of these
Fig. 3 Availability of whole genome sequences for African countries from
which travelers entered Rwanda. Gray circles denote the number of
sequences available in GISAID for each country on a given date. Blue circles
correspond to the number of sequences included in our analyses. Red
crosses mark the collection dates of Rwandan sequences with travel history
from the respective countries. Although few to no sequences are available
from Burundi, Gabon, South Sudan, and Tanzania, these travel history data
point to SARS-CoV-2 lineages circulating in these countries, to the extent
that returning travelers from these countries import those lineages into
Rwanda.
Fig. 4 Lineage diversity sampled in Rwanda across four time points: May–Jul 2020 (n= 28), Aug–Oct 2020 (n= 86), Nov–Dec 2020 (n= 74),
Jan–Feb 2021 (n= 28). Lineage B.1.380, a Rwanda-specific lineage, dominated the sampled diversity during the first wave. Lineage A.23.1 first appeared in
Rwanda in October 2020, and quickly attained a significant proportion of the sampled SARS-CoV-2 genome sequences. More recently, we detected and
sequenced single cases of the B.1.1.7 and B.1.351 VOCs, associated with incoming travelers from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
respectively. n: number of positive SARS-CoV-2 samples sequenced.
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countries and Rwanda. However, because of the differences in
sequencing efforts across the globe, we cannot dismiss the
possibility of intermediary locations in these cases. Nonetheless,
all spatial trajectory plots imply the presence of SARS-CoV-2
lineages circulating in Tanzania after May 2020. The difference in
ancestral histories coupled with the fact that these travel history
sequences are genetically distant from each other implies that
multiple SARS-CoV-2 lineages have circulated in Tanzania to this
day.
In addition, subtree A contains a sequence with travel history
to South Sudan. Although over 10,000 COVID-19 cases have
been reported to date13, no genomic sequences were publicly
available for South Sudan before June 2021. The sample tested at
arrival in Rwanda presents us with evidence of lineage A having
circulated in South Sudan during the months of May and June
2020 (Fig. 8D). As expected, the Markov jump trajectory plots for
this sample also show considerable uncertainty in the reconstruc-
tion of the ancestral locations prior to South Sudan. Regardless,
we see some support for ancestry in Kenya, Uganda and the DRC,
which provides further evidence for viral transmission between
the neighboring countries in the area. We compare in
“Supplementary Materials” the diversity of lineages in Rwanda
to that of two of its neighboring countries that have released a
similar number of SARS-CoV-2 genomes, i.e. Uganda and Kenya.
In Supplementary Fig. S6-S8, we show that, while each country
has its own dynamics, Rwanda and Uganda have seen a similar
rise in the number of infections with lineage A.23.1, whereas the
surge in infections with B.1.380 was specific to Rwanda. In
Supplementary Fig. S9 and S10, we show the differences between
the number of recorded travel cases and the estimated Markov
jumps in both subtrees A and B.1, illustrative of the ability of
travel history-aware phylogeographic reconstruction to estimate
transition between countries beyond what has been collected as
part of the metadata associated with the available genomes.
To assess whether virus populations were structured per
country, we performed compartmentalization analyses using tree-
based methods on a posterior distribution of phylogenies in
BaTS16. BaTS yielded significant values for all three statistics:
p < 0.001 for PS and AI, p < 0.01 for MC(Rwanda) in both of the
A.23.1 and B.1.380 subtree analyses. The significant degree of
clustering suggests that for both of these lineages, local
transmission chains have played an important role in driving
the Rwandan epidemic. Because we find a significant tendency for
Rwanda SARS-CoV-2 genomes to cluster according to the
location of sampling, we subsequently investigated the spatial
patterns of virus spread within Rwanda. Our continuous
phylogeographic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 lineages highlight an
important inter-connection of those lineages centered around
Fig. 5 Maximum clade credibility phylogeny for subtree A, representing diversity of lineages A.23 and A.23.1. The phylogeny with associated ancestral
locations was inferred using travel history-aware asymmetric discrete state phylogeographic inference. A total of 33 locations were considered in the
analysis but are grouped for visualization purposes. The branches in the phylogeny are colored according to the geographical location of the reconstructed
ancestral regions. Rwandan sequences are indicated as large tips, colored by associated travel histories (available for 11 of the Rwandan sequences). The
travel history-aware phylogeographic reconstruction on subtree A infers frequent mixing between Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya, with the latter seeing
introduction events from both Uganda and Rwanda. Both Kenya and Uganda are estimated to have seeded introductions into Tanzania, with the former also
seeding an introduction into South Sudan. Importantly, the travel history-aware approach includes (returning infections from) Tanzania in lineage A.23.1,
which could not be inferred via other phylogeographic approaches.
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Fig. 6 Maximum clade credibility tree for subtree B.1, which includes Rwandan lineage B.1.380. The phylogeny with associated ancestral locations was
inferred using travel history aware asymmetric discrete state phylogeographic inference. A total of 37 locations were considered in the analysis. The
branches in the phylogeny are colored according to the geographical location of the reconstructed ancestral regions. Rwandan sequences are indicated as
large tips, colo red by their associated travel histories. A total of six Rwandan sequences with associated travel history are highlighted in this subtree. The
travel history-aware phylogeographic reconstruction on subtree B.1 infers a large local transmission cluster in Rwanda (subtree B.1.380). However, by
incorporating individual travel histories into the phylogeographic reconstruction, we are able to infer that this subtree does not solely represent local
transmission, but also introduction events into Rwanda from Tanzania, Morocco, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Fig. 7 Supported transitions into Rwanda. Mean number of Markov jumps for supported transition rates into Rwanda (Bayes Factor > 3) for subtrees A
and B.1. Support for these rates was determined using BSSVS with a travel history-aware asymmetric discrete phylogeographic model on both subtrees A
and B.1. In both analyses, the majority of introductions into Rwanda were inferred to originate from nearby countries in East Africa, suggesting a substantial
exchange of viral lineages between neighboring countries in the region. We refer to Supplementary Table S3 for the Bayes factor support values for these
reported transitions.
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Kigali, after having been introduced in Rwanda (Supplementary
Fig. S11). Most sequences sampled outside the city appeared to be
evolutionarily linked to sequences sampled within this city area,
and would then correspond to independent dispersal events from
Kigali. However, this phylogeographic pattern, i.e. the central
importance of Kigali within the dispersal history of SARS-CoV-2
lineages, might to some extent result from the higher sampling
effort within the capital city. To assess the effect of sampling bias,
we performed multiple replicate analyses on subsampled data
sets, showing a consistent pattern of spread with the one inferred
on the original data set (Supplementary Fig. S12; see “Supple-
mentary Materials” for additional information on the sensitivity
analysis performed). Regardless, it is likely that a higher sampling
effort outside Kigali would highlight more local transmission and
that this represents an important avenue of further research.
Discussion
Here we describe the pattern of transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in
Rwanda from May 2020 to February 2021. In particular, we
report the spread of a SARS-CoV-2 variant of the A lineage
(A.23.1) with notable amino acid changes in the spike protein as
well as several non-spike protein changes first detected in
Uganda9. Indeed, most SARS-CoV-2 sequence diversity in
Rwandan strains belong to two distinct lineages: A.23.1 and
B.1.380. The latter dominated throughout the early stages of the
pandemic before a shift towards the A.23.1 lineage occurred in
November 2020. A similar pattern was observed in neighboring
Uganda as described by Bugembe et al. ref. 9. The authors
describe the lineage as a variant of concern (VOC) in a sense that
it shares mutations with the currently known lineage B VOCs









































Fig. 8 Ancestral spatial trajectories for individual patients.Markov jump trajectory plots for four selected Rwandan infected individuals with travel history
(returning) from Tanzania (A, B, C) and South Sudan (D). Each individual trajectory corresponds to the Markov jumps in a single tree from the posterior
distribution, with each plot showing the uncertainty across a subsample of 1,000 posterior trees. The horizontal dimension represents the time maintained
at an ancestral location. Vertical lines represent a Markov jump between two locations. The seven most prominent locations across all ancestral paths in
the posterior are displayed along the Y-axis, with “Other” representing the remaining locations. Trajectory plots A, B, and D correspond to the isolates in
subtree A, i.e. EPI_ISL_1064164, EPI_ISL_707772, and EPI_ISL_707712, respectively. Trajectory plot C corresponds to isolate EPI_ISL_960250 in subtree
B.1. In all cases, considerable uncertainty in the ancestral reconstructions can be seen from the pattern of overlapping horizontal lines and the diffuse
density of vertical lines, which indicate considerable support for different ancestral locations (i.e. uncertainty in the spatial reconstruction), and variance in
the reconstructed timing of the introductions. For trajectory plots A, B, and D, we observe similar patterns in the spatial paths reconstructed, where the
isolates find ancestries in Mali/Sierra Leone/Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Kenya prior to each corresponding travel location. In contrast,
trajectory plot C shows support for an ancestry in Rwanda prior to the virus circulating in Tanzania and being reintroduced into Rwanda. This indicates a
bidirectional exchange of viral lineages between the two countries, although the possibility of an intermediary country being involved cannot be discarded
due to unevenness in sampling efforts between countries.
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cleavage site and the 613/614 change). However, functional
analyses are needed to determine whether these mutations have
effects on transmission rates, immune evasion, vaccine efficacy,
and/or case-fatality rates.
In this study, we reported on the ongoing genomic sequencing
efforts in Rwanda, which are complemented with careful collec-
tion of associated travel history metadata of incoming travelers.
These efforts enabled us to exploit this information by perform-
ing joint Bayesian travel history-aware phylogeographic inference
on these data. By applying this recently developed approach, we
demonstrated considerable contributions of neighboring coun-
tries’ sequence introductions into Rwanda (as well as possible
bidirectional exchanges). Of particular interest to this study, we
were able to include traveler cases from Tanzania, Burundi, and
South Sudan while none of these three countries had made any
SARS-CoV-2 genomes available throughout the study period.
According to the data we collected, two infected Rwandan tra-
velers returned from Tanzania on the 16th of June, 2020 and two
more on 4th January, 2021. Our findings also complement a
statement from the WHO17 that a number of travelers from
Tanzania who have traveled to neighboring countries and beyond
have tested positive for COVID-19. Incorporating travel history
information in phylogeographic analysis can mitigate sampling
bias (from unsampled or under-sampled countries)14, although
this cannot fully replace the lack of sequences from other
countries.
The reported import into Rwanda of two VOCs, i.e. B.1.1.7 and
B.1.351, sampled at the Kigali International Airport in late
December 2020 and early January 2021 are of particular interest.
The patient infected with the B.1.1.7 variant was a Burundian
traveling from Burundi while the patient infected with the B.1.351
variant was a Zimbabwean coming from the DRC, suggesting that
VOCs may be actively circulating in neighboring countries.
Indeed, although Burundi and Tanzania have currently no SARS-
CoV-2 sequences uploaded onto GISAID, and South Sudan not
until June 2021, the DRC has shared a total of 416 sequences, of
which 21 are VOCs (eight B.1.1.7 and 13 B.1.351), while Kenya
has shared a total of 1478 sequences.
Ongoing genomic surveillance in Rwanda revealed additional
infections with these VOCs (mostly B.1.351) from travelers
sampled at the airport. In an effort to curb the spread of the
different lineages and variants, and following the upsurge of cases
in November–December 2020, several measures were taken by
the Rwandan government including a 7-day quarantine to all
incoming passengers followed by an RT-PCR test, in addition to
presenting a COVID-19 negative test upon arrival. Furthermore,
the capital city of Kigali went through a total lockdown from mid-
January to early February 2021, and travels between districts were
prohibited until mid-March 2021. A 7 pm to 4 am curfew was
instituted in early February 2021; public offices were closed and
employees were working from their homes. All schools in Kigali
were closed as well, and classes were being held online. Cafés and
restaurants were only providing takeaway services. Churches,
public swimming pools, and gyms were closed (Office of the
Prime Minister - Republic of Rwanda 2021; Supplementary
Table S1). Such suppression mechanisms (population-wide social
distancing, lockdown, school closure, case isolation) have been
shown to have the greatest impact (as far as non-pharmaceutical
approaches are concerned) in terms of transmission control18.
Additionally, all public health facilities received free antigen rapid
diagnostic tests for every single person presenting COVID-19
related symptoms. Moreover, a vaccination campaign was initi-
ated in March 2021, with the aim to vaccinate all front liners and
vulnerable populations (elderly and people with other underlying
health conditions) in the first phase. To this end, Rwanda
received both Pfizer and AstraZeneca vaccines. A rapid and
efficacious vaccination coverage will ease the social and economic
disruptions associated with non-pharmaceutical interventions.
However, a number of published studies19–21 demonstrate evi-
dence of escape of SARS-CoV-2 VOCs from vaccine-induced
immunity. For example, Becker et al. ref. 21. reported a ‘sub-
stantially reduced Ab neutralization for the B.1.351 variant’ on
sera obtained from vaccinated people, highlighting the impor-
tance of genomic surveillance, monitoring incoming travelers,
and efficient contact tracing upon appearance of new variants.
Our results suggest that neighboring countries play an
important role in establishing the circulation of (different strains
of) SARS-CoV-2 in Rwanda. However, due to the unevenness in
sampling across countries, with several not yet having provided
any genomic sequences, additional data are required to accurately
assess the effect of short-distance (e.g. crossing the borders with
neighboring countries) versus long-distance travel in shaping the
Rwandan epidemic.
Methods
Study design. This is an in-depth study of SARS-CoV-2 strains that circulate in
Rwanda from May 2020 to February 2021, in which we describe the demography
and epidemiology of 203 SARS-CoV-2 genomes from collected SARS-CoV-2
positive oropharyngeal swabs. These swabs were obtained from two distinct groups:
from individuals residing in different provinces of Rwanda (n= 189) and from
returning travelers, whose samples were collected at the airport (n= 14). All
samples were extracted from the biorepository of the National Reference Labora-
tory (NRL), in Kigali, Rwanda. Samples with a cycle threshold (Ct) value below 33
were selected, ensuring a wide geographical representation as well as ports of entry,
and case description variables (date and place of RT-PCR test, age, gender, occu-
pation, residence, nationality, travel history) were reported.
Sequencing
RNA Extraction. Ribonucleic acid (RNA) of the virus was extracted from confirmed
SARS-CoV-2 positive clinical samples with Ct values ranging from 13.4 to 32.7 on
a Maxwell 48 device using the Maxwell RSC viral RNA kit (Promega) following a
viral inactivation step using proteinase K according to the manufacturer’s
instructions.
SARS-CoV-2 whole genome sequencing. Reverse transcription was performed
using SuperScript IV VILO master mix, and 3.3 μl of RNA was combined with
1.2 μl of master mix and 1.5 μl of H2O. This was incubated at 25 °C for 10 min,
50 °C for 10 min, and 85 °C for 5 min. PCRs used the primers and conditions
recommended in the nCoV-2019 sequencing protocol (ARTIC Network, 2020) or
the 1,200 bp amplicons described by Freed and colleagues22 (Supplementary
Table S4).
Primers from version 3 of the ARTIC Network and the 1,200 bp amplicons were
used and were synthesized by Integrated DNA Technologies. Samples were
multiplexed using the Oxford Nanopore native barcoding expansion kits 1–12,
13–24, or the native barcoding expansion 96 in combination with the ligation
sequencing kit 109 (Oxford Nanopore). Sequencing was carried out on a MinION
using R9.4.1 flow cells.
Genome assembly. The data generated via the Oxford Nanopore Technology
(ONT) MinION was processed using the ARTIC bioinformatic protocol (https://
artic.network/ncov-2019/ncov2019-bioinformatics-sop.html). Briefly, the
FAST5 sequence files were base called and demultiplexed using Guppy 4.2.2 in high
accuracy mode, requiring barcodes at both ends of the read. FASTQ reads asso-
ciated with each sample were filtered and concatenated via the guppyplex module.
Consensus SARS-CoV-2 sequences were generated via the ARTIC nanopolish
pipeline and assembled for each sample by aligning the respective sample reads to
the Wuhan-Hu-1 reference genome (GenBank Accession: MN908947.3) with the
removal of sequencing primers, followed by a polishing step using the raw
Fast5 signal files. Positions with insufficient genome coverage were masked with N.
Phylogenetic and phylogeographic analysis. We downloaded all SARS-CoV-2
genomes from the available nextstrain build23 with Africa-focused subsampling
(https://nextstrain.org/ncov/africa) on February 23, 2021. These sequences were
further complemented to include all 203 Rwandan sequences generated in this
study and available on GISAID on February 24, 2021. The 203 Rwandan whole-
genome SARS-CoV-2 genomes were assigned Pango lineages, as described by
Rambaut et al. ref. 1, using pangolin v2 and pangoLEARN model v2021-02-21 by
O’Toole et al. ref. 24. We used Squarify to construct the square treemaps of lineage
diversity across three time points25. We mapped the combined data set against the
canonical reference (GISAID ID: EPI_ISL_406801) using minimap226 and trim-
med the data to positions 265-29,674 and padded with Ns in order to mask out 3'
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and 5' UTRs. We used the resulting alignment to estimate an unrooted maximum-
likelihood phylogeny (Supplementary data 5) using IQ-TREE v2.1.226 using its
automated model selection approach that identified the general time-reversible
model with empirical base frequencies and an auto-discrete-gamma model for
varying rates across sites with eight rate categories (GTR+ F+ R8) as best fitting
the data. We subsequently calibrated this phylogeny in time using TreeTime27
while estimating the molecular clock and skyline coalescent model parameters and
using three SARS-CoV-2 genomes from Wuhan, 2019, as the outgroup.
We went on to perform a discrete Bayesian phylogeographic analysis in BEAST
1.10.528 using a recently developed model that is able to incorporate available
individual travel history information associated with the sequenced Rwandan
samples14,15. Exploiting such information can yield more realistic reconstructions
of virus spread, particularly when travelers from unsampled or under sampled
locations are included to mitigate sampling bias. To this end, and given that it is
not feasible to perform such an analysis on the full data set due to a large number
of sequences, we selected two subtrees in the overall phylogeny (see “Results”
section) that predominantly consisted of Rwandan sequences, consisting of 172
(subtree A) and 218 sequences (subtree B.1), of which, respectively, 11 and six
infected individuals have associated travel history information (Supplementary
Table S2). We incorporated the collection dates for those sequences into our
analyses, and treated the time when a traveler started the return journey to Rwanda
as a random variable given that the time of traveling to the sampling location (in
Rwanda) was not known (with sufficient precision). We specify normal prior
distributions over these 17 random variables informed by an estimate of the time of
infection and truncated to be positive (back-in-time) relative to sampling date. As
in the work of Lemey et al. ref. 14, we use a mean of 10 days before sampling based
on a mean incubation time of 5 days29, and a constant ascertainment period of
5 days between symptom onset and testing18, and a standard deviation of 3 days to
incorporate the uncertainty on the incubation time. We retrieved the 172 and
218 sequences from the full alignment and performed joint discrete
phylogeographic inference on each resulting data set using BEAST 1.10.5,
employing the BEAGLE 3.2.0 high-performance computational library30 to
improve performance. For each of these phylogeographic analyses, we make use of
Bayesian stochastic search variable selection (BSSVS) to simultaneously determine
which migration rates are zero depending on the evidence in the data and to
efficiently infer the ancestral locations, in addition to providing a Bayes factor test
to identify significant non-zero migration rates31. We also estimated the expected
number of transitions (known as Markov jumps)32 into Rwanda from all other
countries in the data set. These analyses ran for a total of 200 and 250 million
iterations, respectively, with the Markov chains being sampled every 100,000th
iteration, in order to reach an effective sample size (ESS) for all relevant parameters
of at least 200, as determined by Tracer 1.733. We used TreeAnnotator to construct
maximum clade credibility (MCC) trees for each subtree.
For each subtree analysis, we assessed whether the SARS-CoV-2 lineages were
structured according to country. To this end, we investigated the association
between phylogeny and sampling location using Bayesian Tip-association
Significance testing as implemented in the BaTS software package16. BaTS allows
testing for a significant degree of taxon-trait clustering by evaluating three different
statistics: parsimony score (PS), association index (AI), and monophyletic clade
(MC) size on a posterior sample of trees. These computed statistics are then
compared to a null distribution of permuted taxon-trait values, corresponding to a
situation of randomly mixed locations, implying a dominant role of importations
over local circulation in establishing the (local) epidemic. We performed our BaTS
analyses on a sample of 1000 posterior trees and computed 100 null replicates.
To explore the local spread of SARS-CoV-2 lineages introduced in Rwanda, we
also performed a continuous phylogeographic analysis following a procedure
similar to one defined by Dellicour et al. ref. 34. Specifically, we used the relaxed
random walk (RRW) diffusion model35 available in BEAST 1.10.528 to infer the
dispersal history of Rwandan lineages along Rwandan clades identified within the
two subtree-specific MCC trees that resulted from the discrete Bayesian
phylogeographic inference described above. To achieve a sufficient level of spatial
precision, the continuous phylogeographic analysis was only based on those
sampled genomes for which the Rwandan sector of origin was known, which is the
maximal level of spatial precision available for these samples. For each sampled
genome associated with this level of sampling precision, which corresponds to 57%
of available Rwandan genomes, we retrieved geographic coordinates from a point
randomly sampled within its sector of origin. The MCMC chain was run in BEAST
1.10.5 for 30 million iterations and sampled every 10,000th iteration, its
convergence/mixing properties were again assessed with Tracer33, and an
appropriate number of sampled trees was discarded as burn-in (10%). The
resulting sets of plausible trees were used to obtain subtree-specific MCC summary
trees using TreeAnnotator, and we then used functions available in the R package
“seraphim”36 to extract spatio-temporal information embedded within posterior
trees and visualize the continuous phylogeographic reconstructions. Finally, we
used the baltic Python library to visualize the phylogenies37.
Ethical approval. The study was approved by the Rwanda National Ethics Com-
mittee (FWA Assurance No. 00001973 IRB 00001497 of IORG0001100/
15April2020). An exemption from informed consent was issued based on the use of
retrospective anonymous data and no medical intervention. The study was further
approved by the IRB of the University of Rwanda, College of Medicine and Health
Sciences (Approval notice No 325/CMHS IRB/2020).
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article.
Data availability
The reported SARS-CoV-2 genomes are available on GISAID (www.gisaid.org) under the
accession numbers EPI_ISL_614763, EPI_ISL_614980, EPI_ISL_615063, EPI_ISL_6150
64, EPI_ISL_615067, EPI_ISL_615069, EPI_ISL_615071, EPI_ISL_615074, EPI_ISL_615
075, EPI_ISL_707711-EPI_ISL_707713, EPI_ISL_ 707771-EPI_ISL_707774, EPI_ISL_
707776, EPI_ISL_707777, EPI_ISL_707779, EPI_ISL_707780, EPI_ISL_707783, EPI_IS
L_707787- EPI_ISL_707790, EPI_ISL_735436-EPI_ISL_735438, EPI_ISL_735444-EPI_
ISL_735448, EPI_ISL_925847-EPI_ISL_925915, EPI_ISL_930567, EPI_ISL_930634,
EPI_ISL_930853, EPI_ISL_960227-EPI_ISL_960302, EPI_ISL_1063900-EPI_ISL_10639
01, EPI_ISL_1063905, EPI_ISL_1063915, EPI_ISL_1063994, EPI_ISL_1064022, EPI_
ISL_1064147-EPI_ISL_1064149, EPI_ISL_1064152-EPI_ISL_1064154, EPI_ISL_1064
163-EPI_ISL_1064166, EPI_ISL_1064168,EPI_ISL_1064170, EPI_ISL_1064171. We have
also deposited the reads used to generate the SARS-CoV-2 genomes into the European
Nucleotide Archive (ENA) under the accession number PRJEB45303.
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